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[Flashback] Mengapa Memilih Sukhoi - "Air Power" sebagai "Deterrent Power" yang Andal
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[Flashback] Mengapa Memilih Sukhoi - "Air Power" sebagai "Deterrent Power" yang Andal
Quote:
("Air Power" sebagai "Deterrent Power" yang Andal
Mengapa Memilih Sukhoi
Oleh: Koesnadi Kardi
Akhir-akhir ini sering kita membaca berita di media massa tentang pesawat Sukhoi buatan Rusia, bahkan beberapa kali muncul pada acara talk show di layar televisi. Berbagai penjelasan telah diberikan, analisis dan argumentasi telah diuraikan, namun masih ada yang menanyakan tentang perlunya pengadaan pesawat Sukhoi.
BAHKAN ada yang mengatakan bahwa pada lima sampai 10 tahun ke depan Indonesia masih belum ada ancaman nyata dari luar jadi mengapa kita membeli Sukhoi? Yang sangat ironis, ada suatu pernyataan, lebih baik membuka ribuan hektar lahan persawahan daripada membeli empat pesawat Sukhoi.
Beberapa pernyataan tersebut bisa dimaklumi apabila mereka tidak mengetahui strategi militer, bahkan strategi udara (air strategy). Singkatnya, di antara masyarakat kita tentu banyak yang bertanya tentang (a) mengapa TNI AU memilih pesawat SU-27 SK dan SU-30 MK buatan Rusia? (b) berapa skuadron pesawat Sukhoi yang sebenarnya kita butuhkan? (c) apa keuntungannya membeli pesawat secanggih Sukhoi?
Seandainya kita mau memahami ketiga jawaban dari pertanyaan tersebut, mudah-mudahan tidak ada keraguan lagi akan pentingnya memiliki pesawat tempur multiroles Sukhoi buatan Rusia. Kecuali bagi mereka yang ingin tampil beda, tentunya hanya akan memberikan pernyataan yang berbeda.
"Detterent power"
Sebelum kita menjawab ketiga pertanyaan tersebut, baiklah kita bersama-sama mengingat sejenak sejarah air power di Indonesia bahwa pada tahun 1960-an kita pernah memiliki air power yang sangat besar dan termasuk terkuat keempat dibelahan Bumi ini. Padahal, keadaan ekonomi kita tidak lebih baik daripada kondisi pada saat ini.
Keampuhan air power tersebut telah dibuktikan pada tahun 1963, di mana Indonesia melaksanakan persiapan secara besar-besaran dalam menghadapi Operasi Trikora untuk merebut kembali Irian Barat (Papua) dari tangan Belanda.
Pada kenyataannya tidak memerlukan effort yang besar karena keampuhan air power pada saat itu benar-benar dapat diandalkan sehingga memiliki deterrent power yang kuat.Dengan menggelar berbagai pesawat tempur dan pesawat bomber di wilayah Indonesia bagian Tengah dan Timur, dengan tujuan utamanya untuk menghancurkan kekuatan militer Belanda di Irian Barat. Kemampuan air power yang dimiliki Indonesia pada saat itu lebih dari 100 pesawat tempur dari jenis MiG-15 sampai dengan MiG-21 dan lebih dari 80 pesawat bomber dari jenis Ilyusin-28 sampai dengan TU-16 KS.
Penggelaran kekuatan udara tersebut akhirnya dideteksi oleh Amerika Serikat melalui kegiatan air surveillance yang kemudian disampaikan kepada Belanda.
Mengetahui informasi bahwa penggelaran kekuatan udara tersebut akan menghancurkan kekuatan militer Belanda, kapal induk Belanda, Karl Doorman, segera pergi dari perairan Papua.
Hasilnya kemudian dapat diprediksi, Belanda menyerahkan Irian Barat ke pangkuan Ibu Pertiwi. Dari analisis akademis, dapat ditarik suatu kesimpulan bahwa apabila kita memiliki air power yang kuat, maka kita akan memiliki deterrent power yang kuat.
Phillips Meilingger, Director of Advance Aerospace Studies dari AS, tahun 1996 mengatakan bahwa whoever controls the air generally control the surface (barangsiapa yang bisa mengendalikan udara biasanya akan mengendalikan permukaan).
Pada buku Air Power Doctrine milik Angkatan Udara Inggris (RAF) ditulis, "If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war, and we lose it very quickly (apabila kita kalah perang di udara, kita kalah perang, dan akan kalah perang dengan cepat)."
Itulah sebabnya, bagi negara-negara maju di dunia, air power sangat dibutuhkan. Ada atau tidak potensi ancaman, mereka tetap concern untuk meningkatkan kemampuan militernya. Sebab, mereka percaya teori Sun Tzu pada 500 tahun sebelum Masehi yang mengatakan, apabila kita siap untuk damai, kita harus siap perang, dan sebaliknya.
Bagi Indonesia, walaupun belum ada perkiraan ancaman nyata dari luar, kita juga harus ingat teori Sun Tzu karena ancaman memang tidak bisa diprediksi
. Amerika Serikat pun tidak mampu memperkirakan tragedi hancurnya World Trade Center (WTC) yang dikenal dengan peristiwa 11 September. Kecuali itu, peningkatan air power suatu negara juga untuk kepentingan keseimbangan kekuatan (balance of power) karena kalau kekuatannya tidak seimbang, bisa memunculkan potensi ancaman baru.
Pilihan
Mengapa TNI AU memilih pesawat SU-27 SK dan SU-30 MK?
Pertimbangan pertama TNI AU memilih pesawat Sukhoi buatan Rusia adalah untuk menggantikan dua skuadron pesawat tempur A-4 Skyhawk yang sudah terlalu tua (seharusnya sudah di-pass out sejak 1990 ).
Pertimbangan kedua, karena kesiapan pesawat tempur kita sangat minim (rata-rata kesiapannya hanya 25-35 persen) akibat embargo AS.
Pertimbangan ketiga, pesawat SU-27 SK (single seat) dan pesawat SU-30 MK (dual seat) memiliki kemampuan multiroles sekelas dengan F-15 dan F-18.
Pesawat tersebut tanpa pengisian bahan bakar di udara (air refueling) mampu terbang selama empat jam. Pesawat tersebut dilengkapi dengan persenjataan guided missile dan guided bomb untuk menghancurkan sasaran dengan sangat presisi.
Pesawat SU-27 SK dan SU-30 MK hampir sama, yang membedakan bahwa pesawat SU-27 SK tugas utamanya untuk supremasi udara (air supremacy), sedangkan pesawat SU-30 MK adalah untuk menghancurkan sasaran di darat dan di laut. Pesawat tersebut mampu melaksanakan operasi udara dalam segala cuaca (all weather condition) baik siang maupun malam hari.
Pertimbangan keempat, yang justru merupakan pertimbangan utama adalah untuk melindungi kepentingan nasional, termasuk menjaga wilayah kedaulatan negara dari dan melalui udara.
Kebutuhan
Berapa skuadron pesawat Sukhoi yang kita perlukan?
Apabila kita kaitkan dengan kelengkapan sistem pertahanan ta udara yang harus diganti untuk menjaga wilayah kedaulatan Indonesia yang sangat luas, di mana jarak dari Sabang sampai ke Merauke hampir sama jaraknya dari London (ibu kota Inggis) ke Baghdad (ibu kota Irak), dan dengan pertimbangan balance of power dengan Negara tetanga, idealnya kita memiliki empat skadron pesawat tempur sejenis pesawat SU-27 SK dan SU-30 MK.
Paling tidak Indonesia bisa memiliki dua skadron Sukhoi. Dengan situasi yang belum stabil seperti ini, minimum dibutuhkan satu untuk dapat menjaga wilayah kedaulatan negara di atau dari udara. Pertimbangan tersebut sangat penting, selain untuk kepentingan menciptakan stabilitas kawasan, juga kita tidak ingin diremehkan oleh negara tetangga. Seandainya kita memiliki sejumlah pesawat secanggih Sukhoi, maka negara tetangga akan menaati peraturan apabila akan terbang melintasi wilayah kedaulatan negara kita.
Apa keuntungannya dengan membeli pesawat Sukhoi ?
Tidak tergantungnya peralatan tempur kita dari dunia Barat saja karena kita memiliki pesawat tempur buatan Rusia (Eropa Timur).
Pesawat tersebut memiliki endurance empat jam terbang tanpa pengisian bahan bakar di udara) sehingga praktis memiliki deterrent power yang sangat diandalkan.
Pembelian pesawat Sukhoi tidak ada persyaratan khusus untuk dipakai di wilayah kedaulatannya sendiri, termasuk tidak ada sanksi embargo dari Rusia.
Spare parts pesawat tersebut dibuat sendiri di pabrik pesawat Sukhoi di Knaapo, Rusia. Rusia bahkan bersedia memberikan license kepada industri strategis kita.
Demikian uraian singkat tentang pilihan TNI AU terhadap pesawat Sukhoi yang saat ini sedang menjadi bahan pergunjingan di DPR. Rencana pengadaan pesawat Sukhoi juga sudah dimasukkan pada Blue Print TNI AU sebagai tindak lanjut dari realisasi reformasi TNI yang sudah dicanangkan sejak 5 Oktober 1998.
Marsekal Pertama Koesnadi Kardi MSc RCDS, Analis Air Power
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..... dan selanjutnya memilih Su-35 karena punya efek deterren yg kuat

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nicronemodez
#35
Quote:
Original Posted By leomar►Terlalu banyak trit yang berkaitan dengan pengganti F-5, maka baiknya saya kutip berita lama yang berkaitan. Kiranya cocok untuk di trit ini karena judulnya Flashback.
Artikel saya potong2 untuk ambil seperlunya saja. Sebenarnya tulisan ini adalah salah satu kenapa Australi ngebet untuk ambil JSF.
_____________________________

Indonesia's TNI-AU has had a long standing interest in the Sukhoi fighters and prior to the Asian economic crisis committed to purchase the Su-30KI. This aircraft was to be supplied by KNAAPO and was derived from the single seat Su-27SMK, a Mid Life Upgrade design package for the baseline Su-27S. The Su-30KI is thus an improved single seat Su-27S, with the improved N001E radar and cassegrain antenna, aerial refuelling probe, centreline OLS-27 IRST, ILS-31 HUD, and provisions for the R-77 Adder missile. This variant is more the air superiority fighter than dual role strike fighter and is essentially a low cost upgrade of the basic production KNAAPO Su-27 line - the use of the early configuration centreline IRST installation suggests the Su-30KI may be built from refurbished low time PVO Su-27 airframes.
In late April 2003, Indonesian President Megawati signed an MoU with Russia for the supply of four Sukhoi fighters, two Su-27SK and two Su-30MK (some sources claim Su-35, others Su-30KI) to the Indonesian TNI-AU later this year. Media reports from Jakarta indicated that the TNI-AU intends to acquire between 48 and 54 of these aircraft over this decade, and often report the inclusion of an aerial refuelling capability - part of the Su-30KI configuration. Whether the TNI-AU aircraft are Su-27SKs, Su-35s, Su-30KIs or Su-30MKs is immaterial in the longer term, since the basic KNAAPO/Irkut T-10 family of designs permits incremental retrofits, and cash permitting any of these variants can over time morph into a more advanced model.
Since then the TNI-AU had its four aircraft delivered. In 2006, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Moscow and ordered an additional six aircraft, as part of a larger arms package.
.....
.....
In close in air combat terms the JSF qualifies as 'double inferior' against the later model Sukhois, since the Sukhois have an advantage in both thrust/weight ratio and in wing loading (interested visitors refer R.L. Shaw's Fighter Combat), and with its canard and thrust vectoring capability will generally be able to gain a firing solution quicker. Because the JSF is designed within the kinematic performance class of the F/A-18 and F-16, it is right in the middle of the performance envelope of aircraft the Sukhoi was designed to kill.
![kaskus-image]()
This chart compares some cardinal design parameters for the Su-30MK series, the JSF and the F/A-18 family, using manufacturer's data. The effective wing loading of the Su-30 is better than depicted, since the aircraft's configuration delivers a considerable amount of body lift. While in the near term the AESAs in the JSF and F/A-18E/F will be competitive, in the longer term the retrofit of AESA technology in the N011M series radar will see the advantage in power aperture go to the Sukhoi - both the JSF and F/A-18E/F are aperture size and cooling capacity limited in growing AESA performance (Author).
![kaskus-image]()
What happens when the existing OLS-27/30/31 series IRST is replaced with a newer longwave Focal Plane Array device - such as a single chip QWIP device? The result will be a capability to engage opposing aircraft under clear sky conditions regardless of RCS reduction measures. While the supercruising F/A-22A can defeat such techniques by kinematics alone, fighters in the teen series performance envelope will have to contend with BVR shots using the R-27ET, R-77, R-77T and R-77M cued by the thermal imaging search and track set. Similar issues arise with the deployment of modern ESM receivers on the Su-30MK, analogous to a number of existing Western systems. The Su-30MK series can then launch long range BVR missiles such as the R-27ET, R-77T with infrared seekers, or the R-27EP and R-77P with passive radio-frequency anti-radiation seekers. If cued by such sensors or offboard sources, these weapons will permit the Su-30MK to engage the JSF despite the JSF's good forward sector radar stealth performance (Author).
On publicly available data the JSF is likely to be detected and engaged by an N011M ESA equipped Su-30 inside the 10 to 20 nautical miles head on range envelope, unless the JSF can get the first shot off and successfully kill the Sukhoi. If the Sukhoi can close with the JSF, all bets are off on the JSF's ability to survive the close in engagement.
For Australia the Su-30 presents the prospect of a more difficult to defend sea-air gap. While we might choose to argue ad nauseam as to whether a future Indonesian regime might opt to get into a fight with Australia, or debate the likelihood of PLA-AF Sukhois being based in the northern apporaches at a future date, or debate India's future role in the near region, the stark reality is that the tyranny of distance which has protected Australia for decades is being rapidly eroded by developing capabilities across the region.
In this context the 2002 JSF decision, and ongoing lobbying for F/A-18E/F interim fighters, seem both to be quite incongruous. Neither aircraft offers a decisive capability margin against the Su-30 series, especially longer term as the sensors, avionics and weapons evolve in the Sukhois and regional players acquire AEW&C aircraft and other supporting capabilities.
The belief in some Canberra circles that the JSF will somehow solve all of the RAAF's force structure problems does not stand up to scrutiny, in the light of the known capabilities and demonstrated growth potential of the Sukhoi Su-30 which is rapidly becoming the 'standard' fighter across the region. Similarly the belief that F/A-18E/F interim fighters will somehow address the capability gap in the F/A-18A HUG fleet is hard to accept. The belief that the F-111's heavyweight counter-air strike capability is now irrelevant also conflicts with the reality that the best way to fight an Su-30 without an F-22A is to shut down its basing from day one of a conflict - and if possible convert the Sukhois to scrap metal in situ - neither achievable with a handful of standoff missile shots.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html
__________________________
Artikel saya potong2 untuk ambil seperlunya saja. Sebenarnya tulisan ini adalah salah satu kenapa Australi ngebet untuk ambil JSF.
_____________________________

Indonesia's TNI-AU has had a long standing interest in the Sukhoi fighters and prior to the Asian economic crisis committed to purchase the Su-30KI. This aircraft was to be supplied by KNAAPO and was derived from the single seat Su-27SMK, a Mid Life Upgrade design package for the baseline Su-27S. The Su-30KI is thus an improved single seat Su-27S, with the improved N001E radar and cassegrain antenna, aerial refuelling probe, centreline OLS-27 IRST, ILS-31 HUD, and provisions for the R-77 Adder missile. This variant is more the air superiority fighter than dual role strike fighter and is essentially a low cost upgrade of the basic production KNAAPO Su-27 line - the use of the early configuration centreline IRST installation suggests the Su-30KI may be built from refurbished low time PVO Su-27 airframes.
In late April 2003, Indonesian President Megawati signed an MoU with Russia for the supply of four Sukhoi fighters, two Su-27SK and two Su-30MK (some sources claim Su-35, others Su-30KI) to the Indonesian TNI-AU later this year. Media reports from Jakarta indicated that the TNI-AU intends to acquire between 48 and 54 of these aircraft over this decade, and often report the inclusion of an aerial refuelling capability - part of the Su-30KI configuration. Whether the TNI-AU aircraft are Su-27SKs, Su-35s, Su-30KIs or Su-30MKs is immaterial in the longer term, since the basic KNAAPO/Irkut T-10 family of designs permits incremental retrofits, and cash permitting any of these variants can over time morph into a more advanced model.
Since then the TNI-AU had its four aircraft delivered. In 2006, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Moscow and ordered an additional six aircraft, as part of a larger arms package.
.....
.....
In close in air combat terms the JSF qualifies as 'double inferior' against the later model Sukhois, since the Sukhois have an advantage in both thrust/weight ratio and in wing loading (interested visitors refer R.L. Shaw's Fighter Combat), and with its canard and thrust vectoring capability will generally be able to gain a firing solution quicker. Because the JSF is designed within the kinematic performance class of the F/A-18 and F-16, it is right in the middle of the performance envelope of aircraft the Sukhoi was designed to kill.

This chart compares some cardinal design parameters for the Su-30MK series, the JSF and the F/A-18 family, using manufacturer's data. The effective wing loading of the Su-30 is better than depicted, since the aircraft's configuration delivers a considerable amount of body lift. While in the near term the AESAs in the JSF and F/A-18E/F will be competitive, in the longer term the retrofit of AESA technology in the N011M series radar will see the advantage in power aperture go to the Sukhoi - both the JSF and F/A-18E/F are aperture size and cooling capacity limited in growing AESA performance (Author).

What happens when the existing OLS-27/30/31 series IRST is replaced with a newer longwave Focal Plane Array device - such as a single chip QWIP device? The result will be a capability to engage opposing aircraft under clear sky conditions regardless of RCS reduction measures. While the supercruising F/A-22A can defeat such techniques by kinematics alone, fighters in the teen series performance envelope will have to contend with BVR shots using the R-27ET, R-77, R-77T and R-77M cued by the thermal imaging search and track set. Similar issues arise with the deployment of modern ESM receivers on the Su-30MK, analogous to a number of existing Western systems. The Su-30MK series can then launch long range BVR missiles such as the R-27ET, R-77T with infrared seekers, or the R-27EP and R-77P with passive radio-frequency anti-radiation seekers. If cued by such sensors or offboard sources, these weapons will permit the Su-30MK to engage the JSF despite the JSF's good forward sector radar stealth performance (Author).
On publicly available data the JSF is likely to be detected and engaged by an N011M ESA equipped Su-30 inside the 10 to 20 nautical miles head on range envelope, unless the JSF can get the first shot off and successfully kill the Sukhoi. If the Sukhoi can close with the JSF, all bets are off on the JSF's ability to survive the close in engagement.
For Australia the Su-30 presents the prospect of a more difficult to defend sea-air gap. While we might choose to argue ad nauseam as to whether a future Indonesian regime might opt to get into a fight with Australia, or debate the likelihood of PLA-AF Sukhois being based in the northern apporaches at a future date, or debate India's future role in the near region, the stark reality is that the tyranny of distance which has protected Australia for decades is being rapidly eroded by developing capabilities across the region.
In this context the 2002 JSF decision, and ongoing lobbying for F/A-18E/F interim fighters, seem both to be quite incongruous. Neither aircraft offers a decisive capability margin against the Su-30 series, especially longer term as the sensors, avionics and weapons evolve in the Sukhois and regional players acquire AEW&C aircraft and other supporting capabilities.
The belief in some Canberra circles that the JSF will somehow solve all of the RAAF's force structure problems does not stand up to scrutiny, in the light of the known capabilities and demonstrated growth potential of the Sukhoi Su-30 which is rapidly becoming the 'standard' fighter across the region. Similarly the belief that F/A-18E/F interim fighters will somehow address the capability gap in the F/A-18A HUG fleet is hard to accept. The belief that the F-111's heavyweight counter-air strike capability is now irrelevant also conflicts with the reality that the best way to fight an Su-30 without an F-22A is to shut down its basing from day one of a conflict - and if possible convert the Sukhois to scrap metal in situ - neither achievable with a handful of standoff missile shots.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html
__________________________
Sukhoi was designed to kill.
Ausi sepertinya koq..nganggep negara kita berpotensi besar ya konflik ama kita (menurut wacana diatas)...apa gara" Ausi nyadar mereka sering bikin kesel kita...
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