The logistical support during the operation

The deployment of Leclerc MBT in Yemen beneficed of a remarkable logistic support.
The supply chain on spare parts or in equipment have been assured by air or see (the port of Aden served as a resupply port after taking Al anab) then by ground to the troops on the front line.

The Emirati logistical units opened ways of repair and resupply all the way down to the lowest echelon, which is obviously capital for the operational availability of the machines and their tactical capacity. For 3 months of combats, a battalion of tank could consume in average 200 shells of 120mm of three different kind.

The evacuation of wounded, sometimes numerous like during the combats of Ma’rib, was not neglected and participated at the good shape of the troops. Here too, aerial and ground ways of medical support were created to evacuate the wounded as fast as possible.

The Leclerc in combat

The Leclerc were exposed to difficult combat conditions and to an accurate enemy fire.

The machine suffered from the sand and the rocks of their zone of operation.
The dust raised by the machine, but most importantly the sand reduced the performance of the armements.
HMG of 12,7mm and 7,62mm suffered frequent missfire due to unexpected jamming.

The nature of the terrain also caused a recrudescence of failure of electro-fans supposed to keep the dust away from the engine due to an accumulation of sand and dust around the rear portion of the tank during it’s movements.

Finally the pads on the tracks suffered a rapid degradation due to the rocky terrain of the Yemen height, forcing some vehicles to roll directly on the track which also lead to a prematury wear and the degradation of some elements of the rolling train like barbotins.

The enemy fire was applied on Leclerc pragmatically.

Optics of the commander and gunner have been systematically the target of collective weapons or precision rifles.

The roof armament has also been targeted in order to make it unusable (Cable of ignition cut or perforation of the weapon itself).

Some tanks suffered fire from heavy collective weapons on the rear section in order to destroy the engine but without success.

The Leclerc have also been the victims of anti-tank mines and IED which put a hard stress on the rollers of three tanks.
All damaged tanks were repaired with success.

However one Leclerc had been definitively neutralized by a direct fire of an ATGM.
The hollow charge went through the frontal section of the tank on the section of the driver compartment killing him and wounding the commander on the legs.

The type of missile isn’t know but looking at the photography and following the video posted by the rebels on combats around Ma’rib we can reasonably think that it wasn’t a Kornet but rather an AT5 or AT5N Konkurs/Konkurs M.

The tank could have been repaired because not technical element necessary to the weapon system was damaged.
It also remind us that no tank is indestructible.

The Saudis lost at least 9 M1A2 to anti-tank fire.

Studying the use of an aditionnal protection comparable to the LEDS system or reactive armor like the Russian system Relikt could be used to mitigate the lack of protection on some parts of the tank.

Finally the Houthis rebels used an intense electronical warfare against the communication system. Radio of French origin in the tanks were affected by jamming, intrusion or interception.

Conclusion

The Leclerc had a more than satisfying availability thanks to a good Emirati logistical chain.

The vehicles handled the enemy fire well and no loss was definitive.

But the only tank hit, frontally, by an anti-tank weapon was perforated and neutralized.

Those the results of the Leclerc in Yemen is paradoxical, they fully satisfied the Emirati army on the operational level but in the same time showed defects in the protection of the crew.

Following the combats on this theater of operation will allow us to better know the capacity of the Leclerc when engaged.